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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
STATEMENT OF AMENITY, INC. 
CAPITAL GENERAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION CERTIORARI 
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION, Docket No. 
Defendant/Respondents. Court of Appeals No 870567-CA 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF FINAL DECISION OF THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Capital General Corporation, Appellant herein, by and through 
counsel, files this Petition for Writ of Certiorari pursuant to Rules 
43 and 46, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are three issues presented for review in this matter: 
First, were Appellant's gifts of securities without registration with 
the Utah Securities Division a violation of Section 61-1-7, Utah Code 
Ann., which prohibits sales of securities without registration 
(contrary to the plain meaning of the statute which does not include 
such a gift, and contrary to a prior ruling by this court that a gift 
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was not a sale within the meaning of the statute)? The second 
question for review is whether there was any basis for the finding 
that the gifts of stock made by Appellant were not made in good 
faith. The third issue is whether the Utah Security Advisory Board 
acted without legal and statutory authority in it's order of 
suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc. stock by basing the suspension 
on Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code Ann. and hence whether the Court of 
Appeals erred by holding that reliance by the Respondents on an 
inapplicable section of the Utah Code was only harmless error. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Review is sought of a July 3, 1989 decision rendered by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
this matter by a writ of certiorari pursuant to Section 78-2-2(5), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Annotated controls herein: 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in 
this state unless it is registered under this chapter or the 
security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14. 
Other pertinent statutes include Sections 61-1-13(15), 61-1-14(3), 
and 61-1-20, Utah Code Annotated, all of which are too lengthy to 
quote here and will be set forth in the appendix. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued on July 3, 1989 which upheld the Final Order of the 
Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Utah 
Department of Business Regulation which suspended all secondary 
trading exemptions of the stock of Amenity, Inc. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 5, 1986, the Utah Securities Division brought an action 
before itself pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act to revoke all trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc. by 
authority of Section 61-1-14. (R. 73-74). The petition alleged, in 
substance, that Appellant had made a distribution of Amenity, Inc. 
stock in violation of Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann., and that such 
was done for the purpose of evading the registration requirements of 
the Securities Act. (R. 73-74). 
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing before an 
administrative law judge who held for the Appellant and denied the 
Respondents' petition by finding "there being no proper basis to 
conclude that the registration requirements of Section 61-1-7 are 
applicable to the disposition of the securities in question." (R. 
31). Respondents sought further review by having a further hearing 
held on January 20, 1987 before the Utah Securities Advisory Board. 
The Board overruled the determination of the administrative law judge 
by ruling that the gifts of stock by Appellant violated Section 
61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. The Final Order of Suspension was later 
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issued pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3), Utah Code Ann. (R. 16-20). 
Appellant filed a petition in the Third District Court for review 
and the District Court summarily upheld the Final Order. 
Appeal was thereafter taken to the Utah Court of Appeals, where a 
decision was issued by that Court on July 3, 1989. This petition for 
a writ of certiorari is taken from that decision. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Amenity, Inc. was incorporated on January 7, 1986 with 
capitalization of 100,000,000 shares of $0,001 par value. (R. 28). 
2. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares were issued to Appellant 
Capital General Corporation for consideration of $2,000.00 cash. As 
of that date, Appellant was the sole shareholder of the company. (R. 
28) . 
3. Appellant is a financial consulting firm, incorporated in 
1971, and has numerous contacts, customers, former customers, 
business associates, etc. in the financial world. 
4. Appellant gave 100 shares from its 1,000,000 shares of 
Amenity, Inc. to each of approximately 900 of such customers, 
contacts, etc. No registration statement for the gifted shares was 
filed. (R. 29). 
5. No consideration or payment of any kind for the stock was 
solicited or accepted. The 90,000 shares of stock given were given 
as free bona fide gifts. The recipients did not have to buy 
anything, become a customer of Appellant, fill out any questionnaire 
or pay or provide any consideration at all, and they were free to 
reject the gifts if they desired. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONFLICT WITH A PRIOR DECISION OF THIS 
COURT AND CONSTRUED THE PLAIN WORDS OF THE CONTROLLING STATUTE 
CONTRARY TO THEIR USUAL AND CUSTOMARY MEANING 
The Court of Appeals held that Appellant's gift of shares of 
stock to 900 individuals comes within the requirements of Section 
61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. It determined that these gifts were 
equivalent to a "sales", and hence subject to registration. It 
reached this conclusion, apparently, by finding that Appellant 
received indirect benefits from the gifts of the stock by the fact 
that once the stock had been distributed, Amenity, Inc. in effect 
became a public company in which Appellant held most of the stock. 
In light of these benefits, the Court equated Appellant's gift with 
"disposition of a security or interest in a security for value," 
which would constitute a sale, as set forth in Section 
61-1-13(15)(a), Utah Code Ann. 
This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict 
with the general proposition that words used in statutes are to be 
construed according to their plain meaning and should not be 
stretched to accomplish a particular purpose not intended or 
specified by the legislature. 
Section 68-3-11, Utah Code Ann. provides that 
Words and phrases are to be construed according to the context 
and approved usage of the language; but technical words and 
phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to be 
construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or 
definition. 
7 
The words "sale" and "sell" are not peculiar or technical words. 
Their definition in the statutes involved here are totally consistent 
with the plain meaning and approved usage in the english language. 
The fact that Section 61-1-13(15)(a) provides that a sale may include 
a disposition for "value" does not significantly add anything to that 
meaning. 
Gord v. Salt Lake City. 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967) at 451: 
The statute should not be stricken down nor applied other than in 
accordance with its literal wording unless it is so unclear or 
confused as to be wholly beyond reason, or inoperable, or it 
contravenes some basic constitutional right. If it meets these 
tests, it is not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom 
or it effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or orderliness 
of the procedures set forth, but it has a duty to let it operate 
as the legislature has provided. 
Had the Utah Legislature intended the prohibition respecting sales of 
securities in Section 61-1-7 to apply also to all gifts of 
securities, it would have been an easy thing for the legislature to 
have included gifts as well as sales in the wording of the statute. 
But it didn't. 
In fact, in Section 61-1-13(15)(c), Utah Code Ann., the 
legislature specified a class of gifts that are specifically brought 
within the definition of "sale or sell": 
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as 
is each assessment levied on the stock. 
Had the legislature intended to carve out any other exceptions that 
would make any other gifts the equivalent of a sale, xt could have 
done so, but it hasn't. 
The courts may not look beyond the words of the statute, but are 
constitutionally bound to ascribe to them their plain meaning. 
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That the Court of Appeals should have done that instead of 
interpreting the word "sale" to include the gifts involved in this 
matter is obvious not only because of legal precedent, but because of 
the reason such precedents have been established. Simply stated, to 
hold otherwise would not be fair or consistent to citizens who rely 
on the common accepted usages of the words and phrases in statutes in 
conducting their affairs. 
The courts have been saying to legislatures and regulatory 
agencies for a long time, and should continue to do so, that they are 
not going to allow those who enforce legislative enactments to go 
beyond the plain meaning of the language. 
The reason for this has been well stated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Andrews v. Chase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 1935). 
Andrews, which was similar to the present case, involved gifts of 
stock and a claim that since something was anticipated in return, 
that it wasn't a gift but a sale. The Court stated: 
The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of securities 
which are exempt from the provisions of the Securities Act. 
Appellant does not contend otherwise. What he does contend is 
that the Act merely regulates the sale of securities and has no 
application whatever to securities which are given away. It 
will be observed that "sale or sell" is defined as every 
disposition, or attempt to dispose, of a security or interest in 
a security for value. The words "for value" are descriptive of, 
and constitute a limitation on, the kind of transactions which 
the Securities Act was intended to regulate. It is a cardinal 
rule of the construction of a statue that, when possible, effect 
must be given to all the language used in the Act. If the 
legislature had intended the words "sale or sell" should include 
"gift or give," it would not have limited the former words to 
such disposals, or attempted disposals of securities as are made 
for value... Had the lawmaking power intended that the Act 
should apply to gifts or securities, it would have been a simple 
matter to have so provided. 
49 P.2d at 941. (Emphasis added). 
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Appellant respectfully submits that that language of the Utah 
Supreme Court has never been overruled, is still valid law and should 
remain such, and applies directly to and is controlling in this case. 
The Court of Appeals erred in going beyond the meaning of the 
plain words of the statue by ascribing "technical expertise" and 
"more extensive experience" to the Securities Advisory Board and 
therefore giving deference to their interpretation of the statute. 
Appellant asserts that none of the cases cited, either in 
Respondents' briefs below, or in the Court of Appeals decision, stand 
for the proposition that such "extensive experience" or "technical 
expertise" of an agency can be used to substitute for the plain 
meaning of the words in a statute. If the decision of the lower 
court is allowed to stand, it is a dangerous precedent restricting 
the rights of citizens with respect to the interpretations of 
statutes in allowing regulatory agencies to place their private 
interpretations in place of the common meaning of words. 
For this reason, the matter should be fully reviewed by this 
Court and decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
POINT TWO 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS 
AFFIRMED THE DETERMINATION OF THE RESPONDENT AGENCY THAT THE SUBJECT 
GIFTS WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH DESPITE THERE BEING NO BASIS IN 
FACT FOR SUCH A DETERMINATION 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion of the Securities 
Advisory Board that the Appellant's distribution of the stock was not 
a good faith gift under Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i), Utah Code Ann. on 
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the basis that the Board's conclusion was reasonable and rational. 
Appellant respectfully submits that there is not a scintilla of 
evidence in the record of any bad faith on the part of Appellant 
which would give the Board a basis for finding a lack of good faith 
in the making of the gifts of stock. 
The record, rather has ample evidence of good faith on the part 
of the Appellant in the action taken in makihg gifts of Amenity, Inc. 
stock: 
1. Testimony at the administrative level indicated a bona fide 
and good faith intent on the part of Appellant to benefit the various 
donees. (R. 118). 
2. Testimony also showed that in furtherance of Appellant's good 
faith intent to benefit the giftees of stock, it took further action 
with respect to the development of Amenity, Inc. into a viable 
business, thus enhancing the value of the gifts. (R. 118). 
3. The testimony was undisputed that Appellant had no intent to 
violate Section 7 of the Act which requires registration of sales of 
stock and it would have been happy to register the gift shares had it 
believed the statute required registering of gifted shares. (R. 118). 
The Securities Act does not contain any provision requiring 
registration in order to convert a private company into a public 
company. Rather, the Act provides only that one cannot sell stock to 
the public without registration. Accordingly, if distribution of 
stock does not come within the meaning of the word sale, then there 
is no violation of the Act by the mere gifting to the stock of a 
private corporation, as discussed in Point One above. 
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There is no evidence in the record on which to base a finding of 
bad faith on the part of the Appellant, or on which to find a lack of 
good faith. This Court should grant the petition for writ of 
certiorari and reverse the determination of the Court of Appeals that 
the Board's conclusion that Appellant did not qualify for the "good 
faith gift" exception of the statute was reasonable and rational 
POINT THREE 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT 
RENDERED A DECISION WHICH HAS SO FAR SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE 
USUAL AND ACCEPTABLE COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR 
EXERCISE OF THIS COURT'S SUPERVISION BY ALLOWING RESPONDENTS TO ACT 
WITHOUT PROPER STATUTORY AUTHORITY BY PROCEEDING UNDER THE WRONG 
SECTION OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND ADOPT A REMEDY NOT AUTHORIZED BY 
THE ACT 
We come now to the third issue, assuming that the gifts in 
question violated Section 7 of the Act: Was the remedy used by the 
Utah Securities Division in suspending trading of the stock under 
Section 61-1-14(3) legally authorized in the statutes? The answer is 
no. 
Appellant very emphatically alleges that even if the gifts of 
Appellant were in fact sales (whether by reason of the circuitous 
reasoning of the lower agency and court which resulted in calling a 
gift a sale, or even if, though not a fact in this case, Appellant 
received money for the shares from a recipient or purchaser) the 
order of suspension below should be set aside as a matter of law for 
the reason that there is no statutory authority for this suspension. 
The Court of Appeals, although apparently conceding in it's 
decision that the Respondents applied the wrong provision of the Utah 
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Uniform Securities Act, dismissed the matter as harmless error. 
This, however, is an incorrect application of the law and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
The question itself of whether the courts should uphold an agency 
action based upon the wrong provision of the law is an important 
question of state law that should be settled by this Court. 
Section 61-1-20, U.C.A., is the proper section under which the 
Respondents should have brought action for a violation of Section 61-
1-7, if indeed the section were violated. It provides for various 
actions that may be taken by the Division of Securities to stop or 
prevent various violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. These 
include the issuance of a cease and desist order after an order to 
show cause hearing is held, or the bringing of an action in the 
District Court to enforce compliance with the Act. In a court 
action, the court is empowered to issue injunctions and restraining 
orders, enter declaratory judgments, order disgorgement, order 
rescission, impose fines, and enter any other just relief. 
In comparison, Section 61-1-14(3) is limited to issues relating 
to Section 14 exemptions that may be denied or revoked by the 
Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the 
Department of Business Regulations. 
The Court of Appeals recognized that this section did not apply 
to the action taken by the Respondents in this case, but brushed it 
off as harmless error by concluding that the same procedural and 
substantive safeguards are afforded by both Section 61-1-14(3) and 
61-1-20. A comparison of the two sections will show that this is not 
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correct. For example, Section 61-1-20 provides that any enforcement 
beyond a cease and desist order that may be issued by the Division of 
Securities must be pursued in the District Court. Such would entitle 
the Appellant and others charged with violation of the act to a jury 
trial. This is not available under Section 61-1-14(3). 
The "harmless error" position taken by the Court of Appeals is 
incorrect even as to the substantive remedy of the two sections in 
that Section 61-1-20 is obviously designed to go against the violator 
of the Act and prevent further violations of the Act and does not 
even mention suspending the stock of a corporation as a possible 
remedy. In comparison, Section 61-1-14(3), where suspension or 
revocation of an exemption is the only remedy discussed, is obviously 
designed to allow correction of situations where exemptions are being 
claimed which should not be - a totally different basis for action 
and a totally different type of remedy. Section 61-1-20 goes against 
the violator, whereas Section 61-1-14(3) goes against all stock and 
affects all holders of the stock, whether violators or not. 
Obviously, the Act was well thought out because if someone sold 
stock in violation of Section 61-1-7, the idea would be to punish or 
enjoin the perpetrator under Section 61-1-20, not suspend trading 
under section 61-1-14(3), which would hurt the purchasers, the very 
persons the Act is designed to protect (assuming they have valid 
exemptions. 
However, it is not necessarily relevant whether Section 61-1-20 
provides similar procedural or substantive safeguards or remedies in 
comparison with Section 61-1-14(3). The heart of the matter is that 
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the Respondents used an inapplicable section of the Securities Act 
and hence acted without authority in suspending the trading of 
Amenity, Inc. stock. 
Any assertion that the Respondents may use an inapplicable 
section of State law to enforce perceived violations of the 
Securities Act is without basis in the law and should be rejected by 
this Court. To allow otherwise would establish a dangerous 
precedent. 
Accordingly, for this reason, as well as for the reasons set 
forth regarding the other issues above, this Court should grant 
certiorari and consider the issues presented here. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1989. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Capital General Corporation/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
F I L E D 
IULr/J989 
Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, Securities 
Division, 
Defendant and Respondent* 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
fT. Noonan 
i of t* Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 870567-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: David H. Day, Murray, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Stephen G. Schwendiman, William B< 
McKean, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Or me* 
ORME, Judge: 
Capital General Corporation ("CGC") appeals the district 
court's affirmance of the Utah Securities Advisory Board's 
suspension of all secondary trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc. 
stock. The Board concluded that CGC had violated the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act by distributing 90,000 shares of 
Amenity, Inc. stock without registration. We affirm. 
THE UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
The Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 
to -30 (1986), vests the Utah Securities Division with the 
authority to regulate the issuance and subsequent trading of 
securities within the state of Utah. One of the Act's primary 
purposes is to prevent fraudulent or inequitable securities 
transactions. See, e.g., Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah Sec. 
Piv.. 744 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This task is 
accomplished largely by requiring registration with the 
division, including the disclosure of information deemed 
pertinent to the investing public, before certain securities 
transactions may be legally consummated, id. CGC challenges 
the division's authority to require registration of the 
Amenity, Inc. shares at issue here, which CGC asserts were 
merely "given away." 
FACTS 
On January 7, 1986, Amenity, Inc. was incorporated with 
capitalization of 100,000,000 shares, each having a one-tenth 
of a cent par value. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares of 
Amenity, Inc. stock were issued to appellant CGC, a financial 
consulting firm, for $2000. Shortly thereafter, CGC 
distributed a total of 90,000 of those shares to approximately 
900 of its clients, business associates, and other contacts. 
CGC claims it distributed the Amenity, Inc. shares to create 
and maintain goodwill among clients and contacts, and it is 
undisputed that CGC did not receive any monetary or other 
direct financial consideration from those receiving the stock. 
After the distribution, CGC and its distributees held 100% 
of Amenity, Inc.'s outstanding stock; CGC held 91%, and the 
distributees held the remaining 9%. From all that appears, 
Amenity, Inc. had no actual business function at this time and 
its sole asset was the $2000 CGC had paid for the 1,000,000 
shares. Shortly thereafter, Amenity, Inc. was acquired by 
another company. CGC was instrumental in this acquisition and 
received $25,000 for its efforts. 
On June 5, 1986, the Utah Securities Division filed a 
petition seeking the suspension of all possible secondary 
trading exemptions for Amenity, Inc. stock.1 The petition 
alleged that CGC distributed the 90,000 shares of Amenity, Inc. 
stock in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986). 
An evidentiary hearing was held before an administrative 
law judge, who denied the petition and ruled that the Act's 
registration requirements did not apply to CGC's distribution 
of the Amenity, Inc. stock. The division sought further 
administrative review of this matter, and a second evidentiary 
hearing was subsequently held before the Utah Securities 
Advisory Board. After the hearing, the Board rejected the 
1. The primary effect of such an order is to force each party 
holding the affected shares to register with the division prior 
to any further trading. Absent such an order, holders of 
shares may avoid registration and trade their shares freely if 
a secondary exemption can be claimed. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-14 (1986). 
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administrative law judge's recommended conclusion that the Act 
did not apply, instead concluding that CGC's distribution of 
the 90,000 shares was indeed covered by the Act and, without 
registration, violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 (1986). 
Accordingly, the Board issued an order of suspension pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1986). CGC filed a petition in 
the district court seeking reversal of the Board's order. 
Following the district court's affirmance, CGC brought this 
appeal. 
This case presents three issues of apparent first 
impression in Utah: First, whether the division may require 
registration under the Act where securities are distributed to 
others without cost; second, whether the Board's conclusion 
that CGC's distribution was not a "good faith gift" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(d)(i) (1986) is reasonable and 
rational; and third, whether Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14(3) (1986) 
provides a legal basis for the Board's order of suspension. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
CGC brings this appeal, which technically is from the 
district court's affirmance of the Board's order. However, we 
essentially disregard the district court's disposition and 
"review the administrative decision just as if the appeal had 
come directly from the agency*"2 Technomedical Labs, 744 
P.2d at 321 n.l. See also Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, 
Gas & Mining. 675 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Utah 1983). 
The questions presented here are mixed questions of law 
and fact or involve the interpretation of "special law." See, 
e.g., Utah Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983); Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at 
323. Moreover, the relevant concepts and terms, treated in the 
next three sections of this opinion, are ones with which the 
Board has both "technical expertise" and "more extensive 
experience." Administrative Services, 658 P.2d at 610. Thus, 
2. We have previously noted our disapproval of this 
inefficient, two-tiered approach to judicial review of agency 
decisions, where first the district court and then an appellate 
court review an agency decision "on the record." See Davis 
County v. Clearfield Citv, 756 P.2d 704, 710 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The Utah Administrative Procedure Act wisely avoids 
this duplicative procedure. I£. See Utah Code Ann 
§§ 63-46b-15 to -17 (1988). The Act, however, does not apply 
to this or other administrative proceedings commenced before 
the effective date of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-22(2) (1988). 
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we review the Board's decision for reasonableness and 
rationality. Hurlev v. Board of Review, 767 P.2d 524, 527 
(Utah 1988). See Tavlor v. Utah State Training School. 109 
Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The more likely it is 
that agency expertise will assist in resolving an issue, the 
more deference courts should give to the agency's 
resolution."). Furthermore, it is appropriate to broadly 
construe the provisions of the Act to effectuate the 
legislative intention behind it. See, e.g., Technomedical 
Labs, 744 P.2d at 322. 
DISPOSITION FOR VALUE 
CGC first argues that the division's authority to require 
registration of stocks is limited by Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 
(1986), which provides, with our emphasis, that "[i]t is 
unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this 
state unless it is registered . . . or the security or 
transaction is exempted under § 61-1-14." Thus, we must 
determine if CGC's disposition of the 90,000 shares was an 
"offer or sale" of Amenity, Inc. securities. 
We first turn to § 61-1-13(15)(a), which provides that an 
"offer or sale" includes the "disposition of . . . a security 
for value." CGC essentially argues that the concept "for 
value" mandates a direct exchange of economic considerations 
between the transferor and transferee in order for the 
transaction to qualify as an "offer or sale" under § 61-1-7. 
Hence, since CGC received nothing from its transferees, CGC 
claims its disposition of the Amenity, Inc. stock was not an 
"offer or sale." The Board, however, took a more liberal view 
of the phrase "for value" and held § 61-1-7 did in fact apply. 
We must determine whether the Board's decision is within the 
bounds of reason and rationality. 
In Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at 324, this court 
affirmed the Board's interpretation and application of the term 
"benefit" as it appears in § 61-1-13(12), implicitly accepting 
the Board's equating "benefit" with "value." 
The [division] found no reason to limit 
the definition of "benefit" to monetary 
benefit . . . . The [division] relied 
upon two federal cases in support of that 
position. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. 
Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250 
(4th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 
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937, 94 S. Ct. 1936, 40 L.Ed.2d 287 
(1974); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. 
Harwvn Industries Corp., 326 F.Supp. 943 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Datronics and Harwyn, 
the courts were asked to decide if the 
distribution of a subsidiary's 
unregistered shares as a dividend to the 
parent's shareholders constituted a "sale" 
requiring registration under the Federal 
Securities Act of 1933 . . . . Whether a 
"sale" had occurred depended upon whether 
the distribution was "for value." Both 
courts held value would be gained by the 
creation of a public market. . . . Such 
value includes: 1) an enhanced ability to 
borrow; 2) an enhanced ability to raise 
equity; 3) the availability of a method of 
valuing assets; 4) an enhanced liquidity 
of assets; and 5) the prestige associated 
with publicly held companies. The 
[division] concluded the term "value" in 
Harwyn and Datronics is substantially 
synonymous with "benefit" in the instant 
case. 
14. 
Especially in light of the above, the Board's 
determination that CGC's disposition of the Amenity, Inc. stock 
was "for value" is reasonable and rational. In this regard, it 
was appropriate for the Board to consider both the intended and 
unintended consequences of the disposition. The evidence 
before the Board clearly establishes that, prior to the 
disposition, CGC held $2000 worth of stock in Amenity, Inc., a 
privately held company engaged in no apparent business 
operations. By "giving away" 90,000 shares (or 9% of its total 
holdings), CGC essentially transformed Amenity, Inc. into a 
publicly held company, ripe for acquisition, in which it held 
most of the stock. As we observed in Technomedical Labs, 
"value" can include enhanced abilities to borrow, raise 
capital, and other general benefits associated with publicly 
held companies, all of which CGC received through the 
disposition. We agree these economic benefits render the 
disposition "for value" under § 61-1-13(15)(a), even though 
those benefits flowed indirectly from the marketplace rather 
than directly from the transferees.3 
GOOD FAITH GIFT 
CGC additionally argues that even if the disposition was 
Hfor valueM in some broad sense, still § 61-1-7 was not 
violated because the disposition was a -good faith giftw under 
§ 61-1-13(15)(d)(i). At all stages of this dispute, including 
on appeal, CGC bears the burden to prove its entitlement to the 
-good faith gift- exception to the definition of -offer or 
sale-- Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14.5 (1986). See also 
Technomedical Labs, 744 P.2d at 323. The Board determined CGC 
failed to meet this burden and consequently held the 
disposition was not a -good faith gift.- This conclusion was 
largely based on the Board's finding that through the 
disposition CGC intended to circumvent the Act's registration 
requirements.4 The conclusion finds further support in the 
fact that CGC's veiled but fairly obvious purpose was to 
3. CGC cites Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935), 
as support for the proposition that a -gift- of securities is 
not a -sale- for purposes of § 61-1-7. We do not agree with 
this assertion for at least two reasons. First, Andrews is of 
extremely doubtful precedential value given the subsequent 
amendments to Utah's securities laws. For example, the Act now 
explicitly provides that a -good faith gift- is not a Hsale,-
implying that any gift other than one made in good faith is a 
-sale.- Even more compelling is that the Andrews holding would 
most likely be different if the case arose under the amended 
Act, which now provides that Ha purported gift of assessable 
stock,- as that distributed in Andrews, is a -sale- and subject 
to § 61-1-7. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(15)(c)(ii) (1986). 
Second, even if Andrews has any remaining precedential value 
under the amended Act, the present facts are distinguishable 
and would compel a different result. In Andrews, the gift of 
stock was made with the mere expectation of future, speculative 
benefits in the form of assessments the donees would 
voluntarily choose to pay. See Andrews, 49 P.2d at 942. Here, 
the disposition of the Amenity, Inc. shares created an 
immediate, actual benefit to CGC in that it now owned 
substantial shares in a public company which, but for the 
disposition, would be a private company. 
4. Typically, a private company wishing to -go public" must 
comply with one of three registration procedures. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-8 to -10 (1986). 
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advance its own economic objectives rather than to make a gift 
for reasons of simple generosity. 
While perhaps CGCfs stated intention to gratuitously 
benefit the distributees without circumventing the Act is not 
entirely void of candor, it is easy for us to see how the Board 
would reject the idea and instead conclude that CGC's actual 
purpose in making the distribution included an intent to 
convert a private company into a public company without 
registration. The effect of this transformation, in addition 
to circumventing the Act's registration requirments, was to 
greatly enhance the value of the significant block of Amenity, 
Inc.'s outstanding stock which CGC continued to hold. 
Additional evidence of CGC's economic self-interest and its 
lack of gratuitous intentions is shown by the fact that CGC 
similarly converted at least thirty other private companies 
into public companies using the same method employed here. 
Like Amenity, Inc., at least three of these companies were then 
acquired by other companies, resulting in substantial profits 
for CGC. 
We agree that CGC has failed to prove its entitlement to 
the "good faith gift" exception, and the Board*s conclusion 
that CGC*s disposition was not a -good faith gift" is 
reasonable and rational. Accordingly, because the disposition 
was "for value," we affirm the Board's conclusion that CGC 
violated § 61-1-7 by failing to register its Amenity, Inc. 
stock before the distribution. 
STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE BOARD'S ORDER 
CGC's final contention is that § 61-1-14(3), which 
authorizes the Board to deny or suspend certain secondary 
trading exemptions, does not authorize the order of suspension 
challenged here. CGC argues that since it is not claiming any 
secondary trading exemption, there is no basis for the 
suspension and the Board erred in issuing the order in reliance 
on § 61-1-14(3). However, even if CGC is technically correct 
in its assertion, we would hold it harmless error. 
We held above that CGC violated § 61-1-7 in distributing 
the Amenity, Inc. shares without registration. The Board has 
the power to remedy a violation of § 61-1-7 under § 61-1-20, 
which includes the power to issue an order of similar legal 
effect to the order involved here. Given the procedural 
history of this case, § 61-1-20 does not extend any additional 
or different procedural or substantive safeguards from those 
actually employed by the Board. Accordingly, we see no 
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prejudice to CGC even if the Board issued its order citing a 
technically inapplicable provision of the Act.5 
We affirm. 
Gregp^y K. Orme, Judge 
CONCUR: 
Russe 
~_^^w*C 
ch, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge /J 
5. Since CGC is the only party challenging the order on this 
appeal, we have no occasion to determine if the order was 
properly issued as to the distributees holding the remaining 9% 
of Amenity, Inc. stock. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
: ORDER 
) 
In the Matter of the : Civil No. C87-2625 
Registration Statement of ) 
AMENITY, INC. s Judge Pat Brian 
) 
This matter was heard before this Court on September 
L7. 1987, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner was represented by David 
H. Day while the Respondent was represented by Nicholas E. Hales, 
Assistant Attorney General. Both parties had previously f i l ed 
briefs with the Court outlining their pos i t ions . 
The Court, after having heard oral argument, reviewed 
the briefs on f i l e , and examined the record from the 
administrative proceedings, rules as follows: 
The Final Order of the Utah Security Advisory Board and 
the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation 
is upheld. 
DATED this /$ day of September, 1987. 
"Z 2 ^ 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
*£T8CFUTAH . 
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DEPUTS 
Order of February 18, 1987: 
Pinal Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the 
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading 
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc. pursuant to 
514(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act* 
Utah Securities Division 
Department of Business Regulation 
Heder M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Post Office Box 45 80 2 
Salt Lake City, DT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 53 0-6600 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF 
AMENITY, INC. 
FINAL ORDER 
CASE NO- SD-86-11 
This proceeding was initiated pursuant to a Petition, 
dated June 5, 19 86. A memorandum in support of a suspension or 
trading exemptions was filed by the Division on July 15, 1986. 
On August 12, 1986, Respondent filed a response to the Division's 
memorandum. The Division filed a reply memorandum on September 
2, 1986. On September 25, 19 86, oral argument was heard before 
the Administrative Law Judge, J. Steven Ecklund. Mr. Ecklund 
issued his findings of fact, conclusions ot law and recommended 
order on October 28, 1986. 
On January 8, 19 87, the Utah Securities Advisory Board 
and William E. Dunn, Executive Director of the Department of 
Business Regulation, after careful review of Mr. Ecklundrs 
recommended order, issued an order adopting certain provisions of 
Mr. Ecklundfs findings of fact and conclusions of lawf but 
rejecting the recommended order. The January 8th Order called a 
hearing on January 20, 19 87, for the limited purpose or receiving 
evidence as to the intent of Capitol General Corporation and its 
principals in their distribution of Amenity stock. We 
incorporate the January 8th Order herein by reference. 
On January 21, at 3:00 p.m. the additional hearing was 
held. The hearing was held before the Utah Securities Advisory 
Board with J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judge, 
conducting the hearing. Respondent Amenity, Inc. was represented 
by David Day while Petitioner Utah Securities Division was 
represented by Nicholas E. Hales, Assistant Attorney General. 
The Utah Securities Advisory Board and William E. Dunn 
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation, 
after careful consideration of all the evidence presented by both 
parties at both hearings, and review of the briefs on file, 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Final Order: 
• 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Capital General Corporation has incorporated 
approximately 30 other companies ("companies") and caused them to 
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of 
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity* 
2. In June of 1986- Amenitv Inc. was acquired by Elkin 
Weiss and Companies Inc Two additional "companies" have also 
been acquired. They are Olympus Enterprisesf now Florida Growth 
Industries, Inc., and Y Travel, now H & B Carriers, Inc. 
3. Capital General Corporation was instrumental in the 
acquisition of Amenity, Olympus, and Y Travel by the acquiring 
companies. Capitol General received $25,000.00 for the services 
it performed. 
4. The distribution of Amenity stock was done with an 
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act and the registration provisions contained 
therein. 
- 3 -
Conclusions of Law 
As was concluded in our January 8/ 1987, Order, as a 
matter of law, the term "good faith gift" in the context in which 
it is usedf i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a 
bona fide gift of securities given in "good faith", i.e., not 
given with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act and, most relevant to the instant 
case, the registration provisions contained therein* We have 
found that the distribution of Amenity stock was done with an 
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act* As such, we conclude that the 
distribution of the gifted Amenity stock was not done ,in good 
faith. 
We have previously concluded that .the gift distribution 
of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an 
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. The distrih«+-inn of the Amenity stock is not 
entitled to the good faith exclusion provided by the Act because 
it was not done in good faith. The Respondent has not 
demonstrated the existence of any exemption or exception for the 
Amenity distribution. No registration of the stock has been 
sought or granted. We must conclude that the distribution ot 
Amenity stock constituted the unregistered offer or sale of a 
security in violation of the Act. 
- 4 -
ORDER 
THEREFORE, pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, it is hereby ordered that the use of all 
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc., 
its affiliates and successors, be and are hereby suspended* 
& 
DATED this \'\ day of February, 1987, 
' < < C 
Keith A* Cannon 
Chairmanr 
Securities Advisory Board 
William E* Dunn 
Executive Director, 
Department of Business Regulation 
Jki^uo£ fl'UA,Hfr 
MargaFet 
Member' 
Securities Advisory Board 
Wickens 
s^,K -\ .w~*>^ •>-_. 
Kent BUrgen,^;/ r 
Member - / * 
Securities Advisory Board 
!• Hardy 
Member 
Securities Advisoky Board 
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Final Order to David H. Day, Day and Barney, 45 E. Vine St., 
Murray, Utah 84107. 
) 
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Order o£ October 28, 1986: 
Recommended Order of J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law 
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities 
Division seekinq suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc. 
stock* 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the Registration Statement 
of Amenity Inc. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
CaseNoSD-86-11 
Appearances: 
Nicholas E. Hales for the Division of Securities 
David H. Day for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated June S. 1986. Thereafter, 
counsel for the respective parties agreed to submit the matter on memoranda. On July 15,1986, the division filed a 
memorandum in support of a suspension of trading exemptions regarding Respondent's securities. On August 12, 
1986, Respondent filed its' responsive memorandum. A reply memorandum was subsemientlv filed on September 2, 
1986. 
Oral argument was presented on September 25,1986 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the department The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent was incorporated on January 7,1986 in the State of Utah with a capitalization of 
100,000,000 shares of stock at $0,001 par value per share. Respondent's incorporators and directors arc Julie 
Harmon, Cynthia Pasketr, and Jeri Paoersson. 
2. On January 7,1986,1,000,000 shares of stock were issued by Respondent to Capital General 
Corporation for S2,000. Capital General Corporation is a financial consulting firm, whose officers and directors are 
David R. Yeaman, Ms. Paskett, and Ms. Paoersson. The monies paid for the stock represent Respondent's only 
asset. 
3. As of the just-stated transaction, Capital General Corporation was the only shareholder of Respondent. 
Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gave 100 shares of the stock it held to each of approximately 900 people. 
Those who received the stock consist of various contacts, customers, former customers, and business associates of 
Capital General Corporation. 
4. No consideration or payment for the securities thus transferred was solicited or accepted by Capital 
General Corporation. Those who received the securities were not required to purchase anything, become a customer 
of Capital General Corporation, or provide any consideration for the securities in question. Capital General 
Corporation distributed the stock to reward past association and loyalty and to provide exposure of Capital General 
Corporation's consulting business to various financial entities as the means of creating or maintaining good will. 
5. Capital General Corporation has previously capitalized three other subsidiaries, caused said subsidiaries 
to become public, and thereafter sold them in mergers with other companies. Respondent's promoters intend to do 
likewise respecting Respondent. 
CONCLUSIONS OFLAW 
The division asserts that Capital General Corporation's distribution of the stock represents the sale of a 
security within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) and that distribution of said securities without registration oi 
the same constitutes the violation of Section 61-1-7. auoted below. The division urges that both the initial and 
subseouent nuichasers of a nublic offering are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure mandated through 
registration requirements. Thus, the division contends that full compliance respecting both initial registration 
requirements and secondary trading laws must exist and all that possible exemptions from registration requirement 
to future trading of Respondent's securities should be suspended. 
In opposition thereto, Respondent asserts that the distribution of the securities constitutes a good faith gilt. 
which is excluded from the definition of a sale of a security by reason of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). Respondent 
contends that the creation or maintenance of good will is not sufficient consideration to conclude that value has 
passed within the meaning of Secuon 61-M3(15)(a). Respondent further asserts that registrauon requirements am 
inapplicable as to the initial distribution of the securities which occurred, inasmuch as the donees of said distnbuuon 
invested nothing and, thus, do not fall within the clsss intended to be protected by the disclosure afforded through 
registration requirements. Respondent conceeds that any subsequent public trading of the gifted securiues is subject 
to applicable secondary trading laws. 
Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides: 
It is unlawful far any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless it is registered under 
\Sv\s ctep&x QS \fcfcS333SKjj <K tsaasactim&c&Qc^^m^ Secxicia6l-l-l4. 
Section 6M-13(l5)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include: 
. . . every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposiuon of, a security or interest in a security 
for value. 
"Offer" and "offer to sell" are defined in Section 6l-l-13(15)(b) to include: 
. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or soliciation of an offer to buy, a security or interest m a 
security for value. 
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)ffl farther provides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith gift". 
Clearly, the previously-described transaction by Capital General Corporation represented a disposition of a 
security for value within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15Xa) or (b). Despite Respondent's assertion that there is 
insufficient consideration present to find that value passed to Capital General Corporation from the donees of the 
securities in question, the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital 
General Corporation's business in various areas represents the value envisoned by the just-cited statutes. See 
Blackburn vs. Ippofito J la . . 156 So. 2d 550 (1963); King St al. v§, Southwestern Cotton Oil Co,, Okla. App., 585 
?2d 385 (1978). 
Thus, the only remaining question is whether the disposition of the securities constituted a good faith gift 
exempted from compliance with the registration requirements set forth in Section 61-1-7 by reason of the 
applicability of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). TTie division asserts that the transfer of the securiues from Capital General 
Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoid registration requirements mandated by statute 
and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". Concededly, the transfer of the 
securities was made to a significant number of entities and the term "good faith gift" is not defined by statute. 
However, it has been Stated that "there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a 
matter of statutory interpretation." S.E.C. vs. Rawlstnn Pyri\\n ffr, 346 U.S.119,127 ( 1953). Further, there is no 
evidence that the disposition of the securities by Capital General Corporation was conditioned upon either action or 
inaction of the donees of said securities and the mere fact that value passes upon disposition of a security is not such 
as to necessarily conclude that a good faith gift has not been made. 
A more considered review reveals that the recipients of the securities were mere donees, to whom the 
protection afforded by compliance with registration requirements respecting financial disclosure as to the securities or 
the issuer of the same is not relevant Clearly, securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and 
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose. Payable Accounting Corp. vs. McKinlev. Utah. 667 
P.2d 15C1983V Nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances presented, Respondent correctly asserts that the 
purpose generally served by compliance with registration requirements (i.e., protection of the investing public) has 
no applicability as to the donees of the securities in the instant case. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the relief sought in the Petition, dated June 5,1986, be denied and 
said Petition be dismissed, there being no Droner basis to conclude that registration requirements mandated by 
Section 61-1-7 are applicable to the disposition of the securities in question. 
Dated this _ _ day of October ,1986. 
61-1-13 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
(c) With respect to (i) interests in trusts, including but not limited 
to collateral trust certificates, voting trust certificates and certifi-
cates of deposit for securities, or (ii) shares in an investment company 
without a board of directors, "issuer" means the person or persons 
performing the acts and assuming duties of a depositor or manager 
under the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument 
under which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional 
sales contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "is-
suer" means the person by whom the equipment or property is to be 
used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited, 
"issuer" means the partnership itself and not the general partner or 
partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil, 
gas, or mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under 
the titles or leases, "issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or 
right of production, whether whole or fractional, who creates 
fractional interests therein for the purpose of sale. 
(12) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the 
issuer. 
(13) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an 
association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust where the 
interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorpo-
rated organization, a government, or a political subdivision of a govern-
ment. 
(14) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert with 
one or more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the busi-
ness or enterprise of a person. 
(15) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract to 
sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. 
(b) "Offer" or "offer to selFincludes every attempt or offer to dis-
pose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a 
security for value. 
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in Subsections (a) 
and (b): 
(i) any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on ac-
count of any purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of 
the subject of the purchase, and has been offered and sold for 
value. 
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is 
each assessment levied on the stock. 
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or 
entitles its holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of 
the same or another issuer is an offer or sale of that security, and 
also an offer of the other security, whether the right to convert or 
acquire is exercisable immediately or in the future. 
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one security for another 
shall constitute an offer or sale of the security received in a 
conversion or exchange, and the offer to buy or the purchase of 
the security converted or exchanged. 
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(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person re-
ceiving the dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative 
right, to receive a cash or property dividend is an offer or sale. 
(vi) a dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or 
sale. 
(vii) the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, 
reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition 
of assets shall constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as 
well as the offer to buy or the purchase of any security surren-
dered in connection therewith, unless the sole purpose of the 
transaction is to change the issuer's domicile. 
(d) The terms defined in Subsections (a) and (b) do not include: 
(i) a good faith gift; 
(ii) a transfer by death; 
(iii) a transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial inter-
est in a trust; 
(iv) a security dividend not within clauses [clause] (c)(v) or 
(vi); 
(v) a securities split or reverse split; or 
(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in 
which a security is issued in exchange for one or more outstand-
ing securities, claims, or property interests, or partly in such 
exchange and partly for cash. 
(16) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act 
of 1940" mean the federal statutes of those names as amended before or 
after the effective date of this chapter. 
(17) "Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; 
evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription; transferable share; investment contract; burial 
certificate or burial contract; voting-trust certificate; certificate of deposit 
for a security; certificate of interest of participation in an oil, gas, or 
mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or 
lease; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security" does not include 
any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an 
insurance company promises to pay money in a lump sum or periodically 
for life or some other specified period. 
(18) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
iistory: C. 1953, 61-1-13, enacted by L. federal Investment Company Act of 1940, re-
S3, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 16. ferred to in Subsections (3), (10), and (16), ap-
Imendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- pears as 15 U.S.C. § 80a et seq. 
nt rewrote this section to the extent that a Securities Act of 1933. — The federal Secu-
ailed comparison is impracticable. nties Act of 1933, referred to in Subsection 
nvestment Company Act of 1940. — The (16), appears as 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. 
25 
61-1-14 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file 
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one person involved in the 
transaction is an insurance company which is exempt from filing 
under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regu-
latory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or (C) all persons 
involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section 
12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the 
division such proxy or informational material as the division requires 
by rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division 
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the trans-
action or series of transactions at least ten business days prior to any 
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on amy necessary 
consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption 
within ten business days after filing of the proxy or informational 
materials; 
(q) any transaction as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(3) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any 
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with 
respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) 
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any 
entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally. 
No such order may be entered without appropriate prior notice to all inter-
ested parties, opportunity for hearing, and written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, except that the division may by order summarily deny or revoke 
any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding 
under this subsection. Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall 
promptly notify all interested parties that it has been entered and of the 
reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of the receipt of a written 
request the matter will be set down for hearing. If no hearing is requested and 
none is ordered by the executive director or division, the order will remain in 
effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is 
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority 
of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after notice of and 
opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or va-
cate the order or extend it until final determination. The executive director 
may not extend any summary order for more than ten business days. No order 
under this subsection may operate retroactively. No person may be considered 
to have violated § 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale effected after 
the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the burden of proof 
that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the order. 
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61-1-20. Enforcement action authorized — Bond not re-
quired. 
Whenever it appears to the division that any person has engaged, is engag-
ing, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this 
chapter or any rule or order under this chapter, it may take the following 
action: 
(1) (a) issue an order directing the person to appear before the division 
and show cause why an order should not be issued directing the 
person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or 
doing any act in furtherance of the activity; 
(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and 
the date of the hearing; 
(c) the division shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show 
cause upon each person named in the order; and 
(d) the division shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no 
sooner than ten business days after the order is issued. After a hear-
ing, the division may issue an order to cease and desist from engag-
ing in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter or 
any rule or order under this chapter. The order shall be accompanied 
by written findings of fact and conclusions of law. If any person 
named in the order to show cause fails to appear at the hearing, then 
an order to cease and desist may be issued against that person. 
(2) bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the 
appropriate court of another state to enjoin the acts or practices and to 
enforce compliance with this chapter or any rule or order under this 
chapter. Upon a proper showing the court may: 
(a) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory in-
junction; 
(b) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus; 
(c) enter a declaratory judgment; 
(d) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defen 
dant's assets; 
(e) order disgorgement; 
(f) order rescission; 
(g) impose a fine of not more than $500 for each violation ot uu 
act; and 
(h) enter any other relief the court considers just. The court ma: 
not require the division to post a bond. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-20, enacted by L. nated former Subsections (1) through W 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 284, § 29; present Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(f)faH<te 
1986, ch. 107, § 1. Subsection (2)(g); redesignated former Subeec 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- tion (7) and the final sentence as present SuS 
ment added Subsections (l)(a) through (l)(d); section (2)(h); and made minor styiisti 
redesignated part of the former introductory changes, 
language as present Subsection (2); redesig-
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